1 in 3 Election Officials Have Been Threatened. Only 10 States Hide Their Address.

The Brennan Center's early 2026 survey of local election officials found that 32 percent had experienced threats, harassment, or abuse because of their job, down from 38 percent in both 2024 and 2025, but still meaning nearly one in three officials are affected heading into the midterms. Ten states currently let election workers keep their address confidential by law. Most states do not. Here is what the documented cases actually show, and what protects election workers where the law falls short.

Is this an actual pattern, or a handful of extreme cases?

Both the scale and the specific incidents are documented. On the scale side, the Brennan Center's surveys of hundreds of local election officials have found threat and harassment rates between 32 and 38 percent every year since 2024, and roughly a third of officials say they know a colleague who left the job at least partly for safety reasons. On the specific incident side, Reuters reported that Fulton County, Georgia election worker Ruby Freeman had her home address posted on social media after false claims about her election work spread online, and she later testified that people came to her home. Former Washington State elections director Lori Augino had her email, home address, and photo posted on a website labeling her an enemy of the people, alongside a countdown timer. Maine secretary of state Shenna Bellows said her home address and personal cell number were posted online after a 2023 ballot eligibility ruling, and a false emergency call drew police to her home.

One honest limit is worth stating clearly: in these documented cases, the publication of an official's address is confirmed, but the original data source is often not established publicly. We are not going to claim that a data broker specifically caused any of these incidents, because the evidence does not support that.

What has the federal government actually done about this?

The Justice Department launched its Election Threats Task Force in June 2021. By August 2022, it reported reviewing more than 1,000 hostile or harassing contacts from the election community, with about 11 percent meeting the threshold for a federal criminal investigation. That statistic is easy to misread. It does not mean 89 percent of reports were not real or not harmful. It means most did not meet the specific legal bar for a federal charge, while still being destabilizing for the people who experienced them.

The task force has continued bringing cases into 2026. Most recently, John Courtney Pollard pleaded guilty in December 2025 to threatening to kill a Pennsylvania poll watcher, and was sentenced in March 2026 to 10 months in prison and a 5,000 dollar fine. CISA has also documented multiple swatting incidents specifically targeting election workers in late 2023 and early 2024, and issued formal guidance in response.

Which states actually protect an election worker's address?

The National Conference of State Legislatures reported that, as of July 2025, 39 states and Washington, D.C. had some law addressing protections for election officials and poll workers, and 24 states plus D.C. had enacted or updated one since 2020. Only ten states specifically allow election workers to keep their address confidential: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. A smaller group, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, Nevada, and Oklahoma, have gone further and made it a specific crime to publicize an election official's personal information online.

Eligibility for these protections is not automatic even in a covered state. California's address confidentiality provision, for example, covers certain qualified workers who interact with the public in election related roles, but NCSL notes that precinct board members who do not otherwise perform election work are not necessarily included. Check your specific state's statute and your specific role rather than assuming coverage.

What does official guidance recommend?

• Check whether your state allows public employee records to be omitted from online search databases, and opt in if you are eligible, as CISA's swatting prevention guidance recommends.
• Search your own name and address periodically, and set alerts for your name where possible.
• Tighten privacy settings on personal social media accounts and turn off location tracking, per the Election Assistance Commission's personal security guidance.
• Ask counsel about redacting personal information from public records where your state law allows it.
• Share your name and address with local law enforcement and emergency dispatch in advance, consistent with your agency's privacy policy, so responders can recognize a potential swatting call for what it is.
• Report any suspected swatting to local law enforcement, then to the FBI through an Election Crimes Coordinator or tips.fbi.gov, and notify CISA so other jurisdictions can be alerted.

What can data removal actually do for an election worker?

Removal can reduce how many people search profiles connect your name to a home address, phone number, or family members, and it can make it harder for someone to combine your public election role with private contact information. It cannot touch voter registration records where they are public, official biographies, campaign materials, court records, or property records, and it cannot stop an active doxxing post, a repost, or a screenshot that has already spread. If you are experiencing an active threat, the priority is documentation, law enforcement reporting, and your election office's escalation process, not an opt out request on its own. According to Consumer Reports, opt outs done by hand or basic automation clear roughly 27 percent of exposed listings, while ongoing removal handled by real people who monitor and refile reaches closer to 70 percent, which is the difference that matters most during a high pressure election season.

Frequently asked questions

Does my state let election workers keep their address confidential?

Only ten states currently offer this specifically: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Check your state's statute directly, since eligibility often depends on your specific role.

Were these doxxing cases proven to come from data brokers?

No. The publication of an official's address in these documented cases is confirmed, but the original data source is usually not publicly established, and we are not going to claim otherwise.

What should I do if I suspect I am being swatted?

Report it to local law enforcement immediately, then to the FBI through an Election Crimes Coordinator or tips.fbi.gov, and notify CISA so other jurisdictions can be alerted to the pattern.

Is threat activity against election workers actually declining?

The Brennan Center's rate dropped from 38 percent to 32 percent between 2025 and early 2026, a 6 percentage point decline. That is a real improvement, but it still means nearly one in three officials report threats, harassment, or abuse.